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Challenges of Transformation: Innovation, Re-bundling and 
Traditional Manufacturing in Canada's Technology Triangle 
Long Abstract (ca. 200 words): This paper develops a perspective of regional re-
bundling and choosing innovation strategies in overcoming economic decline. This is done by 
focusing on the effects of the recent financial crisis in traditional manufacturing industries, 
analyzing the structure of innovation processes, their development over time and the effects of 
the global financial crisis on them. The consequences are viewed in the context of re-bundling 
existing and new knowledge bases along with other resources to help overcome the crisis. Our 
analysis focuses on Canada’s Technology Triangle – a region 100 km west of Toronto – that is 
widely known for its excellent universities, high-technology spin-off processes and successful 
restructuring toward a “post-industrial” economy. What is less well-known, however, is that this 
region has long been shaped by metal fabricating/processing and other traditional manufacturing 
industries, particularly related to the automobile-supplier sector. The analysis presented in this 
paper is based on semi-structured interviews with 40 manufacturing firms in the region. It 
investigates the degree to which these industries have been affected by the economic crisis; how 
they have adjusted their innovation processes; and whether they have developed regional 
strategies of re-bundling to overcome crisis effects.  
Keywords. Canada’s Technology Triangle; manufacturing sector; global financial crisis; 
re-bundling; innovation practices/strategies  
JEL Classifications. L16; L61; L62; O31; R11  
Comment [A1]: Abstract should be just 
100 words, so we can cut this one? 
  
 
 
Challenges of Transformation: Innovation, Re-bundling and 
Traditional Manufacturing in Canada's Technology Triangle 
Short Abstract (ca. 100 words): This paper develops a perspective of regional re-
bundling in overcoming economic crises. It does this by focusing on the effects of the recent 
global financial crisis on traditional manufacturing. We analyze the structure of innovation 
processes and their development over time in Canada’s Technology Triangle – a region known 
for university-related spin-off processes and successful modernization. What is less well-known 
is that this region has been strongly influenced by traditional manufacturing industries. We show 
that these industries have been well prepared to deal with the effects of the crisis due to ongoing 
innovation and diversification stimulated by prior economic crises.  
Keywords. Canada’s Technology Triangle; manufacturing sector; global financial crisis; 
re-bundling; innovation practices/strategies  
JEL Classifications. L16; L61; L62; O31; R11  Comment [A2]: Max four JEL codes; I 
don't know them so I'll let you two pick. 
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1. Introduction 
To date, limited information is available about the consequences of the recent global 
financial crisis on traditional manufacturing industries, even though these industries, especially 
automobile-related branches, were hit hardest. This study investigates the effects of this crisis on 
regional innovation practices and structures in a case study of “Canada’s Technology Triangle” 
(CTT) – a region about 100 km west of Toronto – which consists of the Kitchener and Guelph 
metropolitan areas.1 This region is regarded as one of Canada’s “model economies,” a claim 
based primarily on the region’s success in the transformation from a traditional manufacturing 
economy to one that increasingly includes new information technologies.  
Between 2001 and 2006, the Kitchener census metropolitan area (CMA) and the Guelph 
census agglomeration (CA) experienced an increase in population and jobs significantly higher 
than the national and provincial growth rates and similar to those in the Toronto CMA (Bathelt et 
al., 2010). The unemployment rates were among the lowest in any Canadian metropolitan area. 
In 2006, the unemployment rate in the Kitchener CMA and the Guelph CA was 5.6% and 5.1%, 
respectively, compared to 6.4% in Toronto and 6.1% in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2006). This 
supports the view that this region benefited from university spin-offs and related transformation 
processes. Numerous information technology firms, such as Open Text and Research in Motion 
– the maker of the now famous Blackberry device – have been successfully spun off by 
researchers and students at the University of Waterloo, establishing a growing high-technology 
sector in the region (Bathelt and Hecht, 1990; Bramwell and Wolfe, 2008), with supposedly high 
growth potential in “creative economy” sectors (BMO Capital Markets, 2008; Florida and 
Martin, 2009).  
In the media hype around CTT’s supposedly “post-industrial” future (Perry, 2009), it is 
often forgotten that the region has a strong manufacturing tradition (English and McLaughlin, 
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1983; Vinodrai, 2011) that remains important for the region today (Holmes et al., 2005; 
Rutherford and Holmes, 2008). Both academic and policy research on innovation tends to focus 
on its “elite” forms in high-technology industries and ignores the often informal innovation 
activities that happen in traditional industries (Rutherford and Holmes, 2007). In 2008, 
approximately 44,100 of 76,700 manufacturing employees (57%) and 1,048 of 2,164 
establishments (48%) in the region fell within traditional manufacturing segments in the metal-
fabricating/processing, plastics and rubber, electrical equipment, and automobile supplier 
industries (Table 1). In the Kitchener CMA, the manufacturing sector had a share of 20.3% of 
the total labor force in 2007, nearly twice the Canadian average (Figure 1). As such, this sector’s 
contribution, despite a precipitous decline in the past decade, cannot be neglected in the regional 
success story.  
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here] 
The onset of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 was unique in both its speed and 
severity, making it reasonable to expect that it would have a significant impact on the region’s 
economy given its dependence on traditional manufacturing. What started as a crisis and collapse 
in the US housing market quickly spread globally through complex webs of financial derivatives, 
causing panic in international credit markets (Engelen and Faulconbridge, 2009). The automotive 
sector – already reeling from drops in sales due to high gas prices at that time – experienced a 
dramatic decline in sales as consumer credit was all but cut-off. Like other economic downturns, 
this led to a crisis of demand as downstream firms cut down on their manufacturing inputs, 
leading to a ripple-effect through the global production system.  
The Kitchener and Guelph metropolitan areas were strongly hit by the crisis as indicated 
by shifts in unemployment figures. In March 2009, the unemployment rate in the Kitchener 
CMA increased to 9.6 %, exceeding the respective figures of the Toronto CMA (8.8 %) and 
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Canada (7.6 %). Compared to a year earlier, unemployment had almost doubled. The region lost 
over 10,000 manufacturing jobs since early 2007, representing more than a 17% loss in this 
sector (Statistics Canada, 2009). The CEO of Guelph-based Linamar, Linda Hasenfratz, warned 
at the annual Canadian Manufacturing Trade Show in Toronto: “There is a worry that we’re 
going to see another wave of bankruptcies” (Van Alphen, 2009). This is, however, not what 
happened as the automobile supplier sector began to recover and new manufacturing jobs were 
created pushing the unemployment rate down (Van Alphen, 2010; Statistics Canada, 2010b; 
2010c).  
This study was designed as one of the first empirical studies in economic geography that 
systematically analyzes the relationship between regional innovation practices and the global 
financial crisis. Accordingly, the current study has three goals: First, it aims to investigate the 
innovation practices and strategies employed by traditional manufacturing firms during the crisis. 
The second goal is to explore in which way firms in these industries have been affected by the 
recent crisis. The third goal investigates which responses and strategies firms have developed to 
cope with the crisis effects. These aspects are analyzed in the context of a conception of regional 
ruptures and re-bundling.  
Based on these goals, the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the conception of 
regional ruptures and re-bundling is discussed that allows us to investigate the effects of 
economic crises on regional development trajectories. Section 3 discusses the methodology used 
and the empirical data analyzed. Section 4 identifies and characterizes the current structure of 
innovation linkages and types of innovation practices observed in the traditional manufacturing 
sector of CTT. Section 5 investigates the effects of and responses to the global financial crisis 
emphasizing the role of ongoing innovation and adjustments. Finally, Section 6 draws 
conclusions.  
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2. Conceptual Background: Re-bundling of Knowledge and Other 
Resources  
This section develops a conceptualization of regional economic development paths that 
led our analysis of the innovation practices and dynamics of CTT’s traditional manufacturing 
economy. We are particularly interested in a framework that addresses the role of major 
economic crises and their impacts on regional development. Much of the literature in economic 
geography on related issues (e.g. Rigby and Essletzbichler, 1997; Boschma and Lamboy, 1999; 
Grabher, 1993; Hassink, 2005; Martin and Sunley, 2006) employs an explicitly evolutionary 
conception of the economy (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988).  
While acknowledging discontinuous technological change, these studies often focus on 
technological continuity and lock-in. Although such a focus helps to understand how 
development trajectories are formed, it is less helpful in periods of crisis characterized by 
unexpected ruptures and discontinuities. A lock-in perspective (Martin, 2010) also appears to 
emphasize past structures rather than looking forward on processes of restructuring or re-
bundling. Similarly, perspectives that emphasize equilibrium tendencies, such as some of the 
resilience approaches (Christopherson et al., 2010), seem ill-equipped to deal with periods of 
fundamental ruptures. This paper assumes, instead, that economies are in a state of constant 
change and ongoing power struggles that might lead to temporary fixes, but not to a static 
equilibrium (Taylor, 2000; Chapman et al., 2004; Bathelt, 2009). Overall, evolutionary accounts 
tend to over-emphasize continuous adaptation while neglecting political economy contexts and 
ruptures (see, also, MacKinnon et al., 2009).  
While recent work combining evolutionary economic geography and resiliency have 
explicitly addressed the role of economic and technological discontinuities in regional economic 
development (Simmie and Martin, 2010), the literature as a whole is still focused on the gradual 
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evolution of regional economies with little discussion about how regions adapt to sudden crises. 
Regional diversification in this approach frequently occurs through a branching process, whereby 
new products and services are based on existing competencies and skills (Neffke et al., 2009). 
When firms diversify their product lines, their new endeavors emerge from the firm’s own 
previous experience and competencies, and from locally available knowledge and resources 
(Boschma and Frenken, 2011). While this process allows firms to move up a supply chain and 
improve their profitability, it also makes them vulnerable to sudden declines in demand. Regions 
with a diverse set of industries and exports, however, may enable local firms to diversify the 
markets and industries they serve by tapping into the varied set of local resources and 
competencies available locally (Frenken et al., 2007).  
The branching-out approach has much in common with the re-bundling perspective 
developed in this paper, though work on branching-out primarily focuses on ex-post analyses of 
regional developments based on large data sets. It also prioritizes a view of regional continuity 
along bundles of related activities and competencies and, as such, may sometimes overlook 
largely unconnected developments after crisis situations.2 In contrast, we are interested to 
develop a conceptualization that includes both related and unrelated developments and allows us 
to study regional development during crisis periods using a qualitative method of inquiry to 
explore the nature of and rationales behind economic decision-making. We are particularly 
interested in investigating how such processes at the firm level translate into regional trends and 
developments in aggregate form.  
Storper and Walker’s (1989) model of regional industrial development makes an 
important step in addressing technological discontinuities by suggesting that regional 
development is characterized by periods of relatively drastic change and periods of more 
incremental, successive changes in the spatial organization of industries. In this model, newly 
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developing industries challenge existing spatial industry patterns and institutional settings, 
causing what Storper and Walker (1989) refer to as “shifting centers” (Scott, 1988).  
We use this model and Penrose’s (1959) analysis of the growth of the firm as a starting 
point for our conceptualization. Penrose’s (1959) work – which provides an important basis for 
the resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) – sees resources as bundles of possible 
services. This suggests that it is not possible to differentiate between resources and their 
respective services, because resources can serve a variety of purposes, depending on the context 
in which they are employed. According to Penrose (1997, 31): “Strictly speaking, it is never 
resources themselves that are ‘inputs’ in the production process but only the services that the 
resources render.” This provides the basis for a relational understanding of resources or, in a 
broader sense, capital. In this way, regional ruptures or crises provide the basis for de-
contextualizing and subsequently re-contextualizing different forms of capital and their specific 
uses. Re-bundling can be understood as both a process through which new resources are 
integrated into the regional production process and how existing resources, such as knowledge, 
are used in different ways to serve a different purpose (Bathelt and Boggs, 2003; Bathelt, 2009). 
In other words, re-bundling is a process that readjusts existing and new, internal and external 
resources to the needs of new socio-political and economic settings. We use the term here with 
respect to regional contexts of crisis and restructuring that start at the firm level and build up in 
aggregate and collective ways to the regional level.  
Political and economic crises strain a regional economy’s social cohesion. They disrupt 
existing transactional networks, releasing resources for alternative uses. Suppliers and service 
firms, previously focusing on the needs of the dominant sector, are now open to new ventures 
and technologies developed in other sectors and/or other regions. Crises lead to two kinds of 
adjustments or shifts: (i) geographical shifts, as assets leave the region; and (ii) 
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sectoral/technological shifts, as assets are re-deployed to the region’s other sectors and 
technologies. Both forms clearly impact the nature of regional innovation. While geographical 
shifts may lead to cumulative shrinking processes (Myrdal, 1957), sectoral/technological shifts 
may cause innovations and capabilities developed in one sector to filter into another. Drawing on 
North American experiences, Feldman and Francis (2006) argue that in periods of crisis and 
discontinuity, entrepreneurial potential can be mobilized, resulting in the establishment of new 
firms that may drive regional development later on. 
Regions begin to recover from a crisis when agents re-bundle the resources at hand (i.e. 
financial, physical, human and social capital) for a new round of accumulation. Interactive 
learning and innovation processes may enable the region’s actors to re-bundle technological 
trajectories if they can mobilize or redirect resources and agents towards collective action 
(Bathelt and Boggs, 2003). Not every new bundle of technologies and related economic activities 
necessarily has a significant positive impact on a region’s development. In order to shape the 
development path and help overcome the regional crisis, a new ensemble of specialized 
resources and competencies must develop. This new bundle must be anchored to the local 
economy by non-ubiquitous resources found within a specialized social division of labor. It also 
must have a certain minimum size and must develop institutions to reproduce itself – to be able 
to achieve broader adaptability in the sense of Grabher and Stark (1997). From a regional 
perspective, this suggests that even though actions in response to a crisis are largely carried out 
by firms based on their own unique situation, these actions (such as layoffs, exiting markets or 
innovating) contribute to the larger regional pool of resources which all firms might draw upon 
through social and spatial divisions of labor within and across value chains.  
The concept of re-bundling does not imply that regional crises are overcome through 
regional assets alone. In fact, re-bundling processes are often initiated or supported by external 
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agents and capital, which may be more or less related to prior developments. For instance, 
integration into global production networks and the resulting access to outside resources and 
markets are often essential to regional competitiveness (Scott, 1998; Amin, 2004; Owen-Smith 
and Powell, 2004). In order to anchor these initiatives within a region and trigger regional 
development, local actors, of course, must also be mobilized – a process that is easier to achieve 
if taking place in related sectors (Boschma and Frenken, 2011). Therefore, the re-bundling 
perspective focuses on those agents and assets which can be mobilized to anchor a particular 
technological trajectory within a region.  
Figure 2 clarifies the relationship between regional economic structure, crisis and the re-
bundling of resources in the context of regional development paths. The sequence shown in this 
diagram begins at time t, when the regional development path is shaped by an industry structure 
that evolved in the past characterized by a traditional mixture of intra-regional and extra-regional 
innovation linkages. In the next stage, time t+1, a political, economic or technological crisis has 
shattered the regional industry structure. Whether this rupture leads to a deeper long-term crisis 
in period t+2 (cases a and b), or triggers re-bundling processes that revive existing and develop 
new structures (cases c and d), depends on the nature of re-bundling and restructuring processes 
that take place at the firm level and the availability and mobilization of additional resources. The 
following brief discussion of re-bundling processes focuses on four ideal-type scenarios at period 
t+2. We particularly focus on different recombinations of resources and the role of innovation in 
structuring re-bundling (Chapman et al., 2004; Martin, 2010):  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Case a: No Re-bundling. This case is characterized by massive plant closures and lay-offs 
leading to long-term decline. Resources remain unused as the unemployment rates sharply 
increase and industrial spaces are left empty. Active re-bundling strategies are not applied and, 
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consequently, new economic linkages in production and innovation are not formed, leading to 
“regional paralysis”.  
Case b: Un-bundling. This scenario leads to a relocation of firms to other regions and 
nations, with consequences similar to case a. In aggregate form, persistent regional decline may 
result, while the regional resource base shrinks and mobile labor leaves the region to find new 
employment opportunities. Existing innovative linkages are minimized and new linkages pass 
over the region, leaving an isolated regional economy with little innovation.  
Case c: Ongoing Re-bundling. The next scenario describes a situation where agents are 
not unprepared for crisis situations, as they engage in continuous innovation and adaptations of 
existing structures and linkages. The crisis still impacts the regional resource base, but firms are 
able to build on prior innovation to minimize regional effects. The likely trajectory is based on 
cumulative development patterns and leads to a slow but steady recovery. This development 
relies on the initiatives of regional agents.  
Case d: Radical Re-bundling. The last scenario is the most optimistic in terms of the 
mobilization of new external resources and the engagement of new agents from other regions and 
countries in the restructuring process. This can lead to a more fundamental, discontinuous shift in 
the regional industry base and innovation structure, especially in relation to cross-regional and 
international value chains.  
 
While Chapman et al. (2004) focus on two distinct paths of re-orientation (i.e. renewal 
and adjustment), our stylized re-bundling scenarios draw a more diverse action-space and extend 
this classification by explicitly distinguishing between internal and external resources. Similar to 
Chapman et al. (2004), we view diversification as an important strategy in overcoming crises. In 
the context of innovation, practices may be incremental or more radical in nature. In the end, 
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aggregate and collective re-bundling activities – the act of re-adjusting longstanding patterns of 
capital investment, accumulation and labor relations – help make regional economies more 
“resilient” to large-scale economic change.3 Resilient regional economies, especially cases (c) 
and (d), may still experience decline and reinvestment in times of crisis, but retain the internal 
capacity to change their industrial structure to take advantage of new markets and industries. 
While entrepreneurship is a critical factor in developing resilient regional economies (Malecki, 
2009), attention needs to be paid to the ability of existing firms to re-bundle existing resources 
and competencies during times of economic upheaval. 
Based on this conceptualization, we next discuss the methodology applied and empirical 
study conducted.  
3. Methodology and Data Basis  
While this study originally intended to investigate the innovation practices in CTT’s 
traditional manufacturing sector and local and non-local innovation linkages with suppliers, 
customers and other partners, our goal shifted with the global financial crisis. We decided to use 
a qualitative framework to explore the nature and dynamics of innovative practices chosen in 
response to the crisis, and understand the strategies behind firms’ actions and decisions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Despite this explorative focus, we organized our survey as a larger random 
sample (while adding a limited number of regional key firms). Through this, we intended to 
represent a substantial part of the region’s traditional manufacturing sector and make more 
general claims about some of the region’s dominant innovation practices and responses to the 
crisis.  
Between November 2008 and May 2009, we conducted 40 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with the owners or managers of industrial firms. These interviews, which lasted from 
30 minutes to over one and a half hours, aimed to investigate what role innovation and R&D 
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played in the creation and maintenance of competitive advantage. First, questions were raised 
regarding the start-up processes, location decisions and the region’s characteristics. Second, 
particular attention was paid to the innovative linkages firms had with local and non-local 
customers, suppliers and competitors. Other topics touched on the firms’ affiliations with 
industry and trade groups, their attendance at trade fairs, use of Internet forums to generate 
innovative ideas, as well as their links to universities or other research laboratories. Third, 
questions were asked to inquire about the nature and effect of the global financial crisis on firm 
performance and innovation.  
Although our study region is primarily known for its high-technology start-up culture and 
university spin-offs, it is also a major center of manufacturing industries in Canada (Figure 1). Its 
proximity to Toronto, the steel mills of Hamilton, the automobile industry in Southern Ontario, 
as well as major US markets contribute to its manufacturing strength. The region and its 
immediate surroundings feature two major automobile plants (Toyota and Honda) and several 
major auto parts manufacturers along with other major industrial firms. These are both locally 
owned as well as subsidiaries of global corporations.  
To select a study population, we first examined the industrial makeup of the Cambridge-
Guelph-Kitchener-Waterloo region. The focus was on sectors with higher than normal 
concentrations in the region, compared to the Canadian average. Table 1 shows the location 
quotients (LQs) related to the number of firms and employees in all 21 manufacturing sectors of 
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for 2008. From this, we selected 5 
traditional manufacturing sectors with above-average concentrations of firms and employees. 
These sectors were plastics and rubber manufacturing (NAICS code 326), fabricated metal 
products manufacturing (332), machinery manufacturing (333), electrical equipment 
manufacturing (335) and transportation equipment manufacturing (336). As shown in Table 1, 
12 
 
these traditional industries are quite important in the region, with about 44,000 employees and 
over 1,000 firms (Statistics Canada, 2008). These sectors are not normally considered to be 
particularly innovative. In fact, a lack of R&D and innovation has been blamed for the gradual 
decline in the region’s traditional manufacturing sectors (Bagchi-Sen, 2001).  
Our study population was created based on a business directory provided by CTT 
Incorporated, the local economic development agency. Within the study region, this database 
listed 642 firms in the 5 sectors selected. From this list, a stratified random sample (with a small 
number of pre-selected key firms) was taken, and 310 firms were approached. After several 
rounds of contacts, 40 firms were successfully interviewed, producing a response rate of 12.9%. 
While this seems low, this was to be expected because the field work was conducted during the 
global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009.  
We began contacting and interviewing firms for this study in November 2008. This was 
within days of the major automobile manufacturers announcing that their last-month sales had 
declined by 25-40% from the previous year (Bunkley, 2008), and less than two months after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. This was clearly reflected in the reactions we experienced: One 
interview, for instance, booked with a small parts manufacturer who produced parts for General 
Motors was canceled by the owner one day after initial plans for an auto bailout were derailed by 
the U.S Treasury, saying that he was “struggling to survive.”4  
As Schoenberger (1991) notes, interviews with executives and managers are laden with 
complex power dynamics. Even in the best of times, it can be difficult for academics to persuade 
executives to spend an hour or more on an interview. This is doubly true during times of crisis. 
Executives of firms that were doing better in the crisis likely had more time – and were more 
willing – to talk to us than those in firms struggling to remain solvent (Welch et al., 2002). In the 
midst of the largest economic crisis in the post-World War II era, managers at firms often felt 
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they had nothing to contribute to a study on innovation and would decline to be interviewed. 
Other potential interviewees were not reached because their firms’ operations had been 
terminated or were in the process of being downsized or shut down.5  
While these are experiences that we share with many large-n surveys, we still believe that 
our study provides substantial insight into innovation dynamics and re-bundling processes in a 
period of crisis. This is because some interviews were done at the onset of the crisis, but others 
took place when the crisis was well on the way and winding down. We also asked firms to relate 
their practices and reactions to those of others and thus gained wider insights into regional 
dynamics. For the same reason, further explorative interviews with economic development 
officers and industry representatives helped us triangulate the firm information.  
Tables 2, 3 and 4 break down the interviewed firms by location, industry group and 
employment size. While there was a slight over-sampling of firms from Guelph and an under-
sampling of firms from Cambridge, this does not represent a systematic bias to our sample 
(Table 2). In terms of sectoral composition, we found no significant difference between the 
overall firm population and our sample (Table 3). Lastly, because of our interest in interviewing 
larger firms, there is a moderate but insignificant bias towards larger firms (Table 4). Overall, 
structural data and the results of triangulation do not suggest that there is a notable bias in our 
sample of firms that could lead to problematic results. Given all the uncertainties of conducting 
empirical research during periods of crisis, we feel confident that our data represents key trends 
and characteristics in our study region.  
[Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
In addition, there are many signs that the region has overcome the worst stage of the 
financial crisis and that ongoing innovation processes, as discussed below, have contributed to 
regional reinvigoration. Between August 2009 and August 2010, for instance, about 8,500 new 
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manufacturing jobs were created in the Kitchener MSA (Statistics Canada, 2010b) and the 
unemployment rate, which had surpassed the national average, decreased from 9.9% to 7.0% 
(Statistics Canada, 2010c). In August 2010, the unemployment rate was below that of the 
Toronto MSA (9.1%) and Canada overall (8.0%). A study of the Ontario Manufacturing Council 
(2010, 1) concluded that “… economic conditions in Ontario’s manufacturing sector have 
stabilized, and have now begun to recover”, particularly related to new technologies and 
innovation in traditional manufacturing sectors.  
4. Structure of Innovation Linkages in the Kitchener and Guelph 
Metropolitan Regions 
4.1 Structure of Sample Firms 
The firms interviewed range in size from two-person machine shops to fully-integrated 
factories of multinational firms. We divided the firms into four categories based on their position 
in the industry’s value chain (Table 5). The fabrication firms (21 out of 40 in our sample) are 
primarily machine shops that do contract work of short-to-medium runs of products using CNC 
machine tool systems. They tend to service firms beyond just the CTT region, with a customer-
base located throughout Southern Ontario. A second group of firms (5 out of 40) provide some 
form of product preparation service, such as electro-plating, finishing, welding or painting. These 
firms service primarily the Southern Ontario region, but some of the firms have key customers 
located in the US. A third category of assembler or system integration firms (2 out of 40) have 
regional customers that are located primarily in CTT and in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). 
These firms take standardized products or commodities available from multiple third-party 
sources or online catalogs, which they assemble into a product according to customer designs. 
The fourth group of firms consists of OEMs – original equipment manufacturers (12 out of 40 
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firms). These OEMs include headquarters of national and international firms, along with branch 
plants of multinational corporations. Among these are also a handful of single-facility 
manufacturers that sell nationally and internationally. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.2 Heterogeneous Innovation Practices 
We asked the firms a series of questions to explore the nature of innovations introduced 
in the last two years (Table 6). A total of 7 firms (17%) indicated that they had not added any 
new processes or products over the last two years. These non-innovators were fabrication or 
coating and heat treating firms, working with mature processes or in niche markets with little 
competition. Two of the firms interviewed, however, were floundering and, according to their 
owners, could not innovate because they were trying to survive. They operated in market 
segments with high-volume products and low profit margins. These two firms were seemingly 
unable to afford the costs of innovation because of fierce global competition and cost pressure. 
Their problems long pre-dated the global economic crisis. They were limited in their capacity to 
produce new linkages in the region, limiting their ability to assist in regional re-bundling efforts. 
But the remaining 5 non-innovative firms provided important services for other manufacturing 
firms in the region. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The majority of the firms (33 firms or 83%) added new products or processes to their 
operations over the past two years prior to our interviews. This was much more than what we 
expected to find in a manufacturing sector that is often viewed as less innovative. This indicates 
that many firms in this traditional industry segment actively contributed to regional re-bundling 
activities. Of these firms, 16 said they added new products, while 17 engaged in process 
innovation (Table 6). Of the firms that provided new products, the majority were OEMs. These 
16 
 
firms were fully involved in the design and manufacture of their products. Although outsourcing 
parts of their production, they kept control over the final assembly, marketing and distribution of 
their products.  
In line with Fuchs and Kempermann’s (2010) and Hahn’s (2010) research of German 
mechanical engineering and automotive industries, we found that many firms in CTT applied 
active innovation strategies. Overall, we were able identify 5 distinct, partly overlapping types of 
innovative practices that generally corresponded with the role firms had in the design of 
products. In aggregate form, this enables us to draw conclusions about regional re-bundling 
processes:  
(a) No Design Involvement. Of the 40 firms interviewed, 15 had no involvement in the 
design of the products and little-to-no knowledge about the end use of the products they work on 
(Table 6). They communicated in a very limited way with their customers to solve problems 
related to the manufacturability of products. This type of firms consisted of fabrication shops (10 
firms) and manufacturing process service firms (5 firms). The firms operated according to 
blueprint or process specifications, worked mainly with mature processes and competed on price. 
Their innovation processes were primarily related to improvements in product-flow and the 
minimization of waste material.  
Only a few firms engaged in some minimal, primarily process-related, innovation 
through their value chains. This was exemplified by the comments of the owner and president of 
a friction-welding firm that sent samples of its products to a metallurgical laboratory in the 
region: “We have had a relationship with them for so long that they have developed the skills at 
that facility [to examine our product for fatiguing], and we recently discovered that other 
[friction welding] firms were sending their material to this lab [as well], because they knew what 
they were looking at” (Interview I201). Friction welding was an uncommon process, and the firm 
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was supposedly one of a handful in North America that provided that service on a contract job 
basis. The laboratory was thus able to offer a unique service to friction welding firms throughout 
North America. Although these firms are unlikely the drivers of regional re-bundling processes 
on their own, the example above demonstrates that even firms with limited innovative capacity 
can provide novel capabilities to a region and create cross-regional linkages.  
(b) Manufacturing According to Customer Specification. In addition to the 15 firm that 
were not involved in the design of products, another 8 firms also worked according to 
specifications provided by customers but, when encountering problems in manufacturing, were 
able to provide some feedback to their customers and suggest changes to the design6. This is best 
exemplified by the metal fabrication shops in our sample. Most of these firms focused on a few 
long-term clients for the bulk of their business and supplemented this with short-run contract 
projects from other firms.7 They typically received the blueprint, determined the best way to 
fabricate the parts internally, executed the fabrication of the parts and components accordingly 
and shipped the finished parts back to the customer or other firms for additional treatment or 
assembly. As one interviewee put it: “The customer just wants the end product to their specs. 
They don’t need to know how we manufacture it” (Interview I221). These firms were expected 
to produce a product reliably according to specifications, with quick turnaround times and 
minimal delays. When problems were encountered, they were often the result of the customers’ 
design not being optimal for manufacturing.  
Many of the firms had limited resources and were not able to research new technologies. 
Even some of the larger fabrication firms were challenged to find resources for innovation, as 
lean production practices and cost-cutting measures forced them to eliminate the capacity to 
engage in exploratory activities. The firms had generally minimized their front office staff and 
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focused on the day-to-day operations of coordinating logistics, purchasing supplies, liaising with 
customers and managing their employees.  
Suppliers were key inputs into the innovative processes of firms in this category. One 
interviewee emphasized: “[Our machinery equipment suppliers are] probably the most important 
input into our processes, and we rely on them heavily to innovate and help solve problems in our 
products” (Interview I225). They provided not only new equipment, but also assistance on how 
to improve processes with respect to the use of machinery. According to our interviews, the drive 
to innovate for short-run contract fabricators could come from the failure to compete for jobs, as 
one founder suggested: “You are going to go out and look for better, cheaper ways of doing 
things, based on the fact that you are not getting success in the bidding process” (Interview 
I220). From a regional perspective, the downside to this kind of innovating-by-purchasing was 
that firms became capital-intensive and reduced their workforce over time. We encountered one 
firm that had expanded its capacity to provide metal coating by making capital investments in 
automated equipment, but found that customers backed out of their agreements in the wake of 
the financial crisis. It becomes an obvious risk for these firms to increase their capacity to attract 
new customers and retain enough existing business to justify these expenditures. 
Most of the supplies needed for day-to-day operations were raw materials, but these 
suppliers were not important beyond the acquisition of information regarding pricing. As one 
interviewee pointed out graphically: “[M]ost suppliers do not give a damn what we do. They are 
just providing you with material. It is generic stuff. You call them, they tell you they have it or 
they do not” (Interview I202). While these firms credited their customers with demanding 
innovation, suppliers – particularly the local sales and support divisions of international CNC 
machinery manufacturers – were necessary in helping them to identify equipment needed to meet 
customer demand, to install new equipment and to train staff (e.g. Gertler, 2004). This kind of 
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capital investment drew heavily on resources from outside the region, but increased the 
capabilities of firms inside. From a regional re-bundling perspective, this kind of process 
innovation through capital investments offers limited competitive advantage over other firms 
(and other regions) that also invest in the same kinds of equipment (Figure 2); yet, it shows that 
these firms were adaptive and generally willing to extend their technological capabilities and 
move into new directions. These firms had some competence to innovate and support 
incremental regional re-bundling.  
(c) Innovation through Customer Consultation. We encountered a few firms (5 of 40) 
which operated similarly to those 8 firms manufacturing according to customer specifications, 
but were set apart by the fact that they consulted on the original product design for a few key 
customers. From this consultation, the firms developed an internal capacity to provide design 
feedback to ease manufacturing, thereby lowering the production costs. Through such exchanges, 
the firms became increasingly involved in early-stage product design. This was not necessarily a 
capability demanded by all clients, but some of those firms, which were engaged in collaborative 
design processes, became also good at solving manufacturing problems for other clients at a 
faster pace than their competitors, increasing product turn-around times.  
For example, one of the firms interviewed started off manufacturing tooling and moulds 
for PTE bottle manufacturing, but over time grew to incorporate design consultation. It 
developed a prototype-testing capacity to ensure customers were choosing the cheapest resins for 
their products. The firm increasingly leveraged this prototyping capability into a broader design 
capacity, allowing the firm to create and produce the bottle designs. As the chief engineer 
suggested: “When we started out, we used to just build one part of the tooling. Now we have 
taken the same industry and we do everything. We do the equipment, we do the prototyping ... 
we have made it so that we are the one source as far as the bottling industry is concerned. Every 
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year, we try to expand on what we can offer our clients” (Interview 203). The design and 
prototyping capacity was expanded into an R&D program allowing the firm to test the viability 
of bio-plastic-based resins, which they hoped to commercialize and offer to customers that were 
looking to produce environmentally-friendly products. This is an extreme example of a firm that 
managed to radically reconfigure itself from a CNC machine shop into a firm with a broader 
product offering. To extend its R&D activities into bio-plastics, the firm worked very closely 
with resin suppliers who had an interest in seeing their raw plastic resins being commercialized 
on a broader basis.  
More generally, firms of this type of collaborative and interactive innovation help 
strengthen the value chain by developing their own novel products, as well as by assisting other 
firms in developing new products. Innovation driven by such practices offers robust 
opportunities for re-bundling in ongoing adjustments and improvements by virtue of 
strengthened value chains and the potential for novel product development. Our case study 
clearly indicates that a necessary condition for innovation through customer consultation is the 
firm-specific knowledge to provide useful feedback on the manufacturability of part designs and 
openness of the customers to receive feedback. It should be reiterated, however, that firms 
indicated that this capacity developed with just one or two clients and became a firm competence 
through these few significant customer relationships.  
(d) Innovation through Integrated Manufacturing and Research Capabilities. We further 
encountered a number of firms that explicitly moved beyond the point of providing feedback on 
the manufacturability of products (12 of 40 firms). They extended their manufacturing activities 
and became systematically involved in early-stage product design with long-term customers. 
Over time, they developed broader manufacturing and research capabilities and created at least 
one division that produced their own designs. This kind of build-up of knowledge from 
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providing feedback on the manufacturability of parts to the creation of new products is an 
example of ongoing re-bundling at the firm level that led to the development of new products 
and a constant reconfiguration of the resource base (Figure 2).  
One of the few firms interviewed with fully integrated manufacturing capabilities was the 
maker of several national brands of outdoor cooking appliances and barbeques. The firm was one 
of the most successful firms in the region and its innovation processes were based on internal 
competencies. They drew little benefit from the region other than access to a strong labor pool. 
The firm used generic and simple manufacturing processes – iron and steel forging – where labor 
represented only a small fraction of their costs and much of the firm’s competitiveness derived 
from design capabilities. The primary benefit the firm received from the surrounding region was 
its flagship store in a nearby location that provided direct market feedback, as the regional 
population mirrored the target customer range (primarily middle-class homeowners).  
One of the challenges the firm faced was the trend toward rising manufacturing costs. 
Further, customers seemed to expect more product features over time, which increased product 
complexity. At one point, the firm tried to hire design firms to develop new products for them, 
but the contract designers did not understand the limitations of the existing manufacturing 
capabilities. They failed to incorporate the current tooling and did not utilize enough of the 
legacy parts from other models, complicating the production lines and the distribution of 
replacement parts. By re-establishing control over the design processes, the firm was able to 
ensure that new products retained a high degree of similarity to previous and concurrent models, 
thereby reducing production costs. Since the firm produces numerous new models each year, and 
not every model sells well to consumers, having a high degree of similarity across product lines 
allows the firm to adjust quickly to demand trends. This is a strategy shared with other firms of 
this type.  
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This firm’s experience as an integrated manufacturer illustrates the value of having an 
internal design department that understands the practical needs of the manufacturing process. 
Despite this success, the demographic trends suggested that the firm will be increasingly under 
pressure to seek ways to lower their labor costs, which could lead to un-bundling processes in the 
future, as the CEO suggested. At this point, however, firms of this type had a distinct 
manufacturing and research competence. Due to their learning and integrated processing and 
design experience, they had become quite flexible and were able to engage in ongoing re-
bundling activities during periods of constant changes and crisis (Bathelt and Boggs, 2003).  
(e) Innovation as Diversification Strategy. A subgroup of 10 firms, which were already 
assigned to one of the other firm types, also indicated that they had made conscious efforts to 
diversify their operations. This strategy was most common amongst fabrication firms working in 
the automotive sector.  Of the 12 OEMs/firms that reported working in the automotive industry 
(Table 6), 7 said that they aimed to become less reliant on automotive customers and had already 
invested in diversification processes before the global financial crisis. The comment of one 
interviewee that “[y]ou might not be familiar with the automotive industry, but it is nerve-
racking” (Interview I236) is representative of the opinions of the firms which were suppliers in 
this sector: “It is [a] challenge every year to come up with cost savings on each and every 
component you are producing ... [The automobile producers] are all demanding a 10% reduction. 
It is a tough business” (Interview I240).  
The challenges and demands of the automotive sector, however, also benefited some of 
the firms by forcing them to improve their efficiency despite the request for year-over-year cost 
cutting that put a significant strain on the firms’ capabilities. This resulted in a search for 
opportunities to diversify.8 A particularly poignant example of this was a tier-two automotive 
supplier that specializes in transmission systems. The firm sought to diversify by purchasing the 
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patents for an off-road suspension dampening system, primarily used on large trucks in mining, 
forestry and the military sector. Through this, the firm tried to re-bundle its existing resources 
while gradually adding on new ones to enter new markets. Other firms took the approach of 
remaining at current capacity, but decreasing the percentage of work in the automotive sector. 
Four firms mentioned wind turbine manufacturing, aerospace and medical devices as areas that 
they engaged more heavily in an effort to diversify and decrease their dependence on the 
automotive industry.9 
Although several firms shifted away from the automotive value chain, some interviewees 
suggested that, in the end, they benefited from prior interaction with automotive firms. Through 
this, they developed internal competencies to continuously improve their own capabilities. One 
firm, specializing in manufacturing for an OEM, commented as follows: “In order to be a 
supplier for someone like … [this OEM manufacturer], you need to have a very strong quality 
program to drive down costs every year. So I think that they have made us a better company” 
(Interview I229). Beyond providing encouragement to drive down costs in production, the firms 
also improved substantially in their ability to design products. As a consequence, OEMs turned 
to them for more assistance in reducing costs. A tier-two supplier commented: “We have become 
more involved in … [providing] feedback and recommendations on product design, and how [a 
product] could be redesigned from the beginning to drive out costs at the end ... There are design 
limitations that the designers need to understand, and that helps reduce costs” (Interview 225). 
An interviewee at a tier-one automotive supplier speaking on the same topic emphasized the 
necessity to combine research and manufacturing in innovation:  
“If the engineers are allowed to just go out and design it in [their] own space 
without looking at the manufacturing side of things, then to take those drawings 
and to say, ‘make this and drive costs out of it’, you have wasted 60% of your 
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possible cost savings. So, we tie in the manufacturing guy with our design 
engineers. We are big believers in design-for-manufacture” (Interview 223).  
As a result, the firm began to design and manufacture its own products through a 
consumer products division, although it was originally a tier-two parts manufacturer making 
simple fuel pump components. The firm made small improvements in the parts they 
manufactured that helped increase fuel efficiency in the end product. Due to past successes, the 
firm quickly expanded its design capabilities through internal developments and acquisitions 
(such as purchasing an automotive design firm in Detroit). The firm is particularly conscientious 
about creating regional supplier-customer networks and helping their suppliers grow with the 
firm. This attitude, along with the mobilization of resources external to the region, created the 
potential for more radical re-bundling processes taking hold regionally, in the form of knowledge 
spillovers along supplier-customer linkages (Figure 2). Certainly, this helped create a setting that 
fosters ongoing learning, adaptation and adjustment processes. 
 
In general, most firms interviewed were proceeding with operations as usual and did not 
plan on changes in their supplier-customer linkages in response to the global financial crisis. 
Many firms remained internally innovative and developed even stronger collaborative 
relationships within their value chains, as indicated by their increased involvement in the design 
of products. This involvement in design increased the potential to adjust to external economic 
pressures and had further positive effects on other firms. As we will discuss in the next section, 
the global economic crisis was, for these firms, just one more crisis they had to weather over the 
past decade.  
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5. Global Crisis and Regional Innovation  
5.1 Firm Responses to the Crisis 
Generally, our interviewees confirmed they were negatively affected by the 2008 
financial crisis. Two thirds of the managers who were asked about the effects of the crisis (22 of 
30 firms) suggested that their business had significantly decreased due to the crisis’ sudden 
nature. Of these firms, all but two reported losses of sales and/or customers due to either 
cutbacks on orders or the bankruptcy of their clients, particularly in the automobile industry. As 
one plant manager of a tier-two supplier said: “The ‘little three’ as I call them [now] were 75% 
of our business, but now they have stopped dead. So they are not doing anything. Any work we 
are doing is for the [Japanese] transplants” (Interview I224). Other firms, ranging from the 
largest industrial employer in the region to small grinding and plating shops with only a few 
employees, mentioned similar, sudden drops in orders.  
Many of the firms avoided a steep decline in the crisis due to existing contracts with 
partners that ensured stable sales (see, also, Fuchs and Kempermann 2010). This was true even 
for some firms supplying the automotive sector.10 Others reported strong sales to sectors not as 
heavily affected by the crisis, such as Alberta’s oil industry or the alternative energy sector (e.g. 
Spears, 2010). The firms typically responded to the crisis in three ways: by laying off workers; 
by finding internal efficiencies and cost savings; and/or by diversifying their markets and 
customer bases: 
(a) Job Decline. As expected, the most common strategy to deal with the decline in sales 
was to eliminate jobs. Of the 22 firms that were explicitly asked about the crisis and responded 
that they were affected by it, 12 confirmed that they laid off workers as a direct result of the 
crisis,11 and many others were significantly smaller than they were three years ago. Some of 
these layoffs were characterized as temporary, and several firms had taken advantage of 
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provincial programs that used unemployment insurance to pay for three days of salary a week, 
with the company paying the remaining two days. Overall, however, layoffs were smaller than 
expected, and many interviewees mentioned that they would try to delay laying off qualified 
personnel for as long as possible in order to preserve their valuable human capital and 
institutional memory. This is a trend generally not expected in an economy that is often classified 
as a liberal market economy.  
(b) Increasing Efficiency. Many firms depended on finding internal efficiencies and 
reductions in manufacturing waste to offset lower sales. However, this strategy was mostly seen 
in larger firms with sufficient cash reserves necessary for internal reorganization. Two firms 
were working towards implementing leaner, more flexible material procurement and tracking 
systems. Smaller firms, and those already suffering heavy losses before 2008, lacked the internal 
resources to undertake intense efficiency improvement measures and were forced to rely mainly 
on cutting labor costs to deal with lower order volumes.  
(c) Diversification. Firms with primary customers in declining industries, such as 
automotive, construction or resource extraction, emphasized diversification as a critical strategy 
(Hamilton, 2009). One firm began a strategic movement away from heavy industrial fabrication 
towards architectural steel, while others pursued markets that were perceived to be either 
growing or holding steady. However, as suggested above, larger firms with in-house R&D and 
engineering competencies were better equipped for such changes. Smaller firms or firms with 
large capital investments in specialized equipment – especially small tool and die and fabrication 
shops – lacked the capacity to quickly re-bundle internal and external resources and enter more 
diverse markets.  
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5.2 Impact of the Financial Crisis on Innovation 
In an economic crisis marked by declining sales to long-term customers, innovation is a 
key strategy for opening up new markets and meeting the clients’ cost-cutting demands, but 
innovation is difficult to implement or sustain in the midst of an economic crisis. Almost without 
exception, firms acknowledged innovation as a main survival tool in a faltering economy. Many 
firms saw new products or lower costs as essential for finding new customers and maintaining 
existing ones. Yet, most of the managers and owners, particularly amongst the fabricators and 
treatment and material preparation firms, did not view themselves as particularly innovative. 
They regarded innovation as internally directed R&D projects aimed at creating new products. 
Lacking their own R&D divisions, these firms did not perceive innovation as a core competence. 
When broadening the discussion to the implementation of efficiency measures, reducing turn-
around times and the reduction of waste, it became clear that many firms in the traditional 
manufacturing sector were indeed innovative and regarded themselves as quite competent at 
reducing costs and improving their manufacturing routines. Similar patterns of innovation 
oriented towards internal efficiencies rather than product development were also noted in studies 
of other regions dependent on traditional manufacturing (Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2000; 
Rutherford and Holmes, 2007; Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2008).  
As suggested by the re-bundling perspective (Bathelt and Boggs, 2003), a crisis is 
simultaneously the best and worst time for innovation. Innovation requires sufficient human 
capital to find ways to increase production or reduce costs, as well as sufficient financial capital 
to either bring in outside talent or to purchase necessary equipment (Bathelt, 2009). During the 
crisis, some firms found that customers were no longer willing to invest in up-front redesign to 
secure cost savings down the line. As one manager put it: “What we think we do is bring 
innovative processes to firms ... Everything has come to a standstill with new business. 
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Companies are dealing with the crisis and are not looking to change. They do not want to change 
sources. So, that limits our ability to grow [our] market” (Interview I209). Many small firms in 
our study, especially fabricators, worked with their clients to find new materials and designs that 
reduced production costs. The firms that developed these new capabilities through ongoing 
customer consultation in manufacturing and design had done this before the crisis.  
Many of the smaller fabrication firms that relied on the purchase of new equipment to 
introduce new firm capabilities were cautious about making large capital investments in this 
uncertain period. The owner of a small production shop said: “... we were going to bring in a new 
product at a lower price point due to the economic conditions ... [but] when we had that second 
drop [in the market], we were a bit more challenged to make that capital outlay” (Interview 
I234). The introduction of new equipment is a form of innovation both in evaluating which 
equipment to buy and integrating it into an existing production line. The economic crisis made it 
harder for small firms without large cash reserves to justify such capital outlays. 
Larger firms, especially OEMs with integrated manufacturing and research capabilities, 
were more likely to see the crisis as an opportunity to lower costs or find new clients. Several 
firms noted that because of the crisis, costs of capital goods and raw materials decreased. A total 
of 5 firms, including some of the largest in our sample, reported taking advantage of the 
downturn in the economy by beginning projects designed to increase the range of products and 
services they offer. Firms able to undertake such projects saw themselves as well positioned to 
rapidly expand after the crisis. These forms of re-bundling activities were only possible when a 
firm had sufficient internal reserves or access to external credit.  
Innovation in traditional manufacturing industries is never an easy task. In a crisis, firms 
are under increased pressure to reduce their costs to retain customers and make up for lost ones. 
Simultaneously, less credit is available for expansion. In our study region, savings were more 
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often found in eliminating waste and inefficiencies in the manufacturing process by either 
changing the materials used, by reducing the time to make a product or by automating labor-
intensive processes. Nearly all firms reported that they eliminated inefficiencies for many years 
in response to previous crises and downturns in the regional economy. Some respondents found 
that there were no inexpensive or easy options left for reducing waste that were not already 
adopted.  
5.3 Innovation due to Prior Crises Adjustments 
Although we expected that the recent global financial crisis would stand out as a major 
rupture in economic development, firms saw this crisis in the context of prior economic ruptures 
and presented their current actions in the light of innovations that resulted from former crisis 
adjustments (see, also, Fuchs and Kempermann, 2010; Hahn, 2010). The current financial crisis 
was only one of several crises and downturns the region’s manufacturing sector experienced 
since the 1990s. While the Canadian Dollar was worth between 0.60 and 0.80 US-Dollars in the 
1980s and 1990s, helping Canadian manufacturers remain competitive, the early 2000s saw a 
sharp appreciation, driving up the relative price of Canadian manufacturers selling to the US. 
This rise in the Canadian Dollar made the region’s manufacturing firms, in the words of a plant 
manager, “... less attractive, instead of really attractive” (Interview I229). Another manager 
supplying to the automotive sector noted that, “[i]f you see the [Canadian] Dollar trading at 0.68 
[US-Dollars] when the pricing is determined, and it moves to 0.81 [US-Dollars], that is a huge 
difference in an industry that does not allow for large margins” (Interview I209). At the same 
time, of course, the rise in the Canadian Dollar decreased the relative price of supplies and 
equipment from the US, partially offsetting the problems with exports.  
Beyond the effects of currency rates, manufacturers throughout the world were hit hard 
by an unprecedented increase in the cost of commodities such as iron, steel and aluminum. 
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Between 2005 and 2007, the International Monetary Fund’s international index of industrial 
commodities increased by over 70% before dropping off significantly in the wake of the global 
financial crisis (International Monetary Fund, 2010). Consequently, many firms saw customers 
shift their purchases to low-cost producers located in Asia and South America. These two crises, 
the shift in the Canadian currency and price increases in industrial inputs, combined with the 
recent financial crisis and global economic downturn, represent almost a complete decade of 
continuous crises in the Southern Ontario manufacturing sector. One manager succinctly 
summarized this situation: 
“This is our third crisis in a row. There’s the current economy downturn that is 
more systemic through the economy, but we were also affected by the Canadian 
Dollar moving to par, and the increase in steel costs. So, we’ve been hit by a 
series of three crises over three years. The steel pricing doubled, so when the price 
of the commodity is 20% to 80% of the cost of the finished product and you get a 
doubling in the commodity price, you see a doubling in the cost of the part. Our 
situation was not unique in the industry. The price the consumer paid did not 
change ... That was a huge issue; it continues to be a big issue. The parts we 
manufacture are not products that change on an annual basis” (Interview I209). 
The strategies of regional firms in traditional manufacturing to gain control of the design 
and innovation processes were, thus, a consequence of earlier economic crises. The responses of 
many of our interviewees suggest that innovation strategies were chosen or modified in reaction 
to these crises. This included tendencies to play a more active role in customer-specified 
manufacturing; increasing customer involvement in incremental innovation; and the use of 
innovation as a driver of diversification. This leads us to conclude that adjustments to prior crises 
have strengthened the adaptability and reduced the vulnerability of the region’s traditional 
manufacturing sector, increasing its “resiliency” in the face of larger structural crises. In 
response to both this and previous crises, firms have re-bundled their existing internal resources 
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and attempted to acquire new external resources to re-orient themselves to deal with new 
economic realities on an ongoing basis (Figure 2; Bathelt and Boggs, 2003).  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has argued that regional economic development trajectories are routinely 
ruptured by crises of different nature. Ruptures due to the global financial crisis set off in 2008 
had a strong impact on the existing regional transaction linkages and networks, potentially 
leading to an abrupt halt in the trajectory or triggering path-shifting processes. The argument 
developed in this paper is that whatever the restructuring or adjustment processes may be, they 
necessarily require an ability to mobilize new and recombine existing regional and extra-regional 
agents and resources into new, more or less coherent, development frameworks to eventually 
overcome the crisis.  
Of the four scenarios of re-bundling discussed in this paper, case c that emphasizes the 
role of ongoing re-bundling, innovation and pro-active adjustments to crises seems to best 
describe the restructuring in the traditional manufacturing sector of the Kitchener and Guelph 
metropolitan regions (Figure 2). Although investigating re-bundling processes at a firm level, an 
aggregate view allows us to draw some conclusions about the regional consequences in CTT. 
There is no evidence that either skilled industrial workers or R&D specialists have left the region 
after the initial shock; indeed regional data points toward reinvigorated growth as, for instance, 
the number of employees in the Kitchener MSA manufacturing sector increased by 17.6% from 
48,200 in August 2009 to 56,700 one year later (Statistics Canada, 2010b). There is also no 
indication of continuing un-bundling after some initial firm closures. Nor have key firms like 
Linamar or Toyota divested in the area.  
Many of the firms that were affected by the economic problems of the past decade 
attempted “to innovate their way out” by either expanding their current array of products and 
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services or finding ways to service new markets and industries using mostly existing 
competencies. Firms used a combination of their own internal resources along with other 
resources available in the community to make this adjustment. Wider international customer 
and/or corporate networks helped these re-bundling activities. Of course, not all firms were able 
to adjust successfully and had to implement cost cutting measures like layoffs and strategic exists 
from competitive markets. Overall, however, the region’s trajectory points toward a branching-
out process where new structures develop based on existing competencies, leading in our case to 
continued diversification. With respect to adjustment processes, our study reveals some 
unexpected findings that challenge existing explanations of economic development in our study 
region:  
(a)  CTT was and still is strongly shaped by traditional manufacturing industries and is not 
well characterized as a “post-industrial” economy.  
(b)  The region’s traditional manufacturing sector was hit substantially by the global financial 
crisis, but restructuring processes and layoffs were not as severe as one could have 
expected. The region remains a strong hub for such manufacturing activities.  
(c)  Although about one third of the firms interviewed were not engaged in active innovation, 
another third had much or full control of the innovation and design process, suggesting 
that there is substantial innovation and adjustment potential in the region’s traditional 
industries.  
(d)  In terms of the spatiality of innovation, results are somewhat mixed. By no means, 
however, did we find that innovation linkages were primarily local or regional in 
character (Bathelt et al., 2011). We expected that some of the smaller fabrication shops 
would be closely tied to the region, supplying local OEMs, but this was rarely the case. 
Several of these shops serviced important clients throughout Southern Ontario and the US 
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Mid-West. The firms closely tied to the region were located there due to low costs in 
shipping their products to major market regions. Some outstanding exceptions existed 
though, such as one tier-one automobile supplier that explicitly developed a supplier 
clustering strategy.12  
(e)  In terms of “regional resilience”, firms in traditional manufacturing industries were not as 
strongly affected by the financial crisis as expected. As shown in our research, firms 
gained adaptability in their responses to prior crises, especially related to new innovation 
strategies, integrated manufacturing and research capabilities, stronger customer 
involvement, as well as increased control over the innovation and design process.  
These findings, although based on a relatively small sample of firms, could have wide-
ranging policy implications, particularly for economic development policies that accept the 
sacrifice of traditional manufacturing sectors for the benefit of support for high technology 
industries. Our study shows that traditional manufacturing firms are not necessarily less resilient 
towards economic crises than other industries. As demonstrated in CTT, traditional 
manufacturing firms can be quite innovative and flexibly adjust to new market situations if they 
engage in ongoing re-bundling activities involving incremental improvements and adjustments, 
the acquisition of new resources, and related diversification and renewal processes. This suggests 
that such regions do not necessarily have to develop a completely new economic make-up, but 
may be able to remain competitive based on existing competencies that enable dynamic 
adaptability. It might, in fact, be more effective to concentrate policy activities to support 
existing, more traditional industries in individual and collective learning, innovation and 
diversification activities than to focus on creating a completely new set of capabilities and 
industries (Boschma and Lamboy, 1999). This is especially important in regions, such as CTT, 
which have a larger traditional manufacturing sector. When aggregated over the entire region, 
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ongoing incremental and discontinuous shifts in firm practices and routines involving internal 
and external resources, may contribute to developing strong regional re-bundling capabilities and 
ongoing growth after the crisis. Our study region indeed indicates a reinvigorated economic 
performance in 2009 and 2010.  
As a consequence of these findings, we have to reevaluate the suggestions by Martin and 
Florida (2009) in a recent economic consulting report about the future development of Ontario, 
prepared for the provincial government. In this report, Martin and Florida (2009) suggest to 
focus government support on the growth of the “creative economy”, while giving up support for 
traditional manufacturing industries. Notwithstanding the criticism of this approach, the 
suggestion to completely ignore traditional manufacturing industries appears premature given the 
evidence provided in this paper. In contrast to this view, the Ontario Manufacturing Council 
(2010, 9) concludes that “[t]he manufacturing sector will need to play a central role in reversing 
Canada’s underperformance in innovation.” The manufacturing sector in the Kitchener and 
Guelph metropolitan regions not only covers a substantial part of the regional economy, it also 
has substantive innovative potential and has successfully adapted to both the past and current 
crises, thus increasing its resistance towards ruptures in the future. In fact, our research suggests 
that specific policy programs for traditional manufacturing industries – which focus on 
supporting knowledge exchange; strengthening research, development and design competencies; 
investing in human capital development; and building wider international producer-user 
networks – could be decisive to help firms engage in ongoing adaptation and innovation by re-
configuring existing and new resources into new coherent development paths.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of the Canadian and Kitchener CMA Labor Force in Manufacturing 
Sectors, 1987-2007 (Source: Statistics Canada, 2010a) 
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Figure 2: Regional Development Trajectories at the Crossroads: Ruptures and Re-Bundling 
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Table 1: Number and Location Quotients (LQs) of Firms and Employees in CTT by Industrial 
Sector, 2008 (Source: Statistics Canada, 2008)  
 
Industrial Sectors by 
NAICS Code 
Kitchener CMA Guelph CA 
 Firm 
LQ 
Number 
of Firms 
Employee 
LQ 
Number of 
Employees 
Firm 
LQ 
Number 
of Firms 
Employee 
LQ 
Number of 
Employees 
311 - Food 
Manufacturing 
1.02 96 2.34 7392 1.16 32 1.60 1308 
312 - Beverage and 
Tobacco Product 
Manufacturing 
0.95 13 0.43 131 1.49 6 5.23 408 
313 - Textile Mills 1.42 17 1.00 278 0.29 1 0.04 3 
314 - Textile Product 
Mills 
1.53 31 2.89 1004 0.51 3 0.24 21 
315 - Clothing 
Manufacturing 
0.60 34 0.80 668 0.48 8 1.74 376 
316 - Leather and Allied 
Product Manufacturing 
1.52 11 0.87 63.5 1.41 3 0.91 17 
321 - Wood Product 
Manufacturing 
1.33 79 0.73 1158 1.09 19 0.47 191 
322 - Paper 
Manufacturing 
0.91 13 1.28 1221 3.10 13 3.22 795 
323 - Printing and 
Related Support 
Activities 
0.98 104 0.69 1069 0.96 30 0.67 267 
324 - Petroleum and Coal 
Product Manufacturing 
1.23 7 0.78 171 1.20 2 0.04 2.5 
325 - Chemical 
Manufacturing 
1.24 53 1.09 1482 1.91 24 2.08 731 
326 - Plastics and Rubber 
Products Manufacturing 
2.09 93 2.55 5347 1.84 24 1.31 709 
327 - Non-Metallic 
Mineral Product 
Manufacturing 
1.25 49 2.14 2091 0.96 11 2.22 560 
331 - Primary Metal 
Manufacturing 
1.71 23 1.51 1111 0.76 3 0.36 69 
Comment [A3]: This row was italicized, 
we would like it to be made somehow 
distinct in the final form of the table 
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332 - Fabricated Metal 
Product Manufacturing 
2.05 329 2.35 8654 2.04 96 3.16 3004 
333 - Machinery 
Manufacturing 
2.49 272 2.83 7671 1.62 52 4.13 2882 
334 - Computer and 
Electronic Product 
Manufacturing 
1.78 87 3.79 4837 0.77 11 0.90 296 
335 - Electrical 
Equipment, Appliance 
and Component 
Manufacturing 
2.13 56 2.82 2255 1.43 11 4.69 967 
336 - Transportation 
Equipment 
Manufacturing 
1.65 75 3.66 7446 2.99 40 9.89 5199 
337 - Furniture and 
Related Product 
Manufacturing 
1.30 114 1.80 2836 0.82 21 0.34 136 
339 - Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
1.17 165 1.40 1929 0.77 32 0.46 163 
Total - 1721 - 58816 - 442 - 18106 
Selected Industry Total  - 825 - 31373 - 223 - 12761 
Note: Reference values for the computation of location quotients were the respective Canadian totals. Selected traditional 
manufacturing sectors are shown in italics.  
 
Comment [A4]: This row was italicized, 
we would like it to be made somehow 
distinct in the final form of the table 
Comment [A5]: This row was italicized, 
we would like it to be made somehow 
distinct in the final form of the table 
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Table 2: Number and Share of Interviews in CCT by Location of Firms, 2008-2009 (Source: 
Survey Results) 
 
Cities Firm Population Firms Interviewed 
Cambridge 271 (42%) 11 (28%) 
Guelph 138 (21%) 15 (37%) 
Kitchener 130 (20%) 7 (18%) 
Waterloo 103 (16%) 7 (18%) 
Total 642 (99%) 40 (101%) 
Note: χ2=7.51 (d.F.=3) is insignificant at α=.05. 
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Table 3: Number and Share of Interviews in CTT by Industrial Sector, 2008-2009 (Source: 
Survey Results) 
 
Industrial Sectors by NAICS 
Code 
Firm 
Population 
Firms Interviewed 
326 - Plastics and Rubber 
Products Manufacturing 
19 (3%) 1 (2%) 
332 - Fabricated Metal 
Product Manufacturing 
369 (60%) 26 (65%) 
333 - Machinery 
Manufacturing 
139 (23%) 7 (17%) 
335 - Electrical Equipment, 
Appliance and Component 
Manufacturing 
48 (8%) 2 (5%) 
336 - Transportation 
Equipment Manufacturing 
36 (6%) 4 (10%) 
Total 611 (100%) 40 (99%) 
Note: Not all firms in the data base have NAICS codes assigned 
to them; therefore the total number of firms is lower than that in 
Table 1. Some categories are recoded for statistical analysis: 
χ2=1.51 (d.F.=3) is insignificant at α=.05. 
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Table 4: Number and Share of Interviews in CTT by Firm Size, 2008-2009 (Source: Survey 
Results) 
 
Number of 
Employees 
Firm Population Firms Interviewed 
1-10 244 (40%) 9 (23%) 
11-25 128 (20%) 8 (20%) 
26-50 84 (14%) 6 (15%) 
51-75 36 (6%) 6 (15%) 
76-100 25 (4%) 3 (8%) 
101+ 99 (16%) 8 (20%) 
Total 606 (100%) 40 (101%) 
Note: Not all firms in the data base have employee numbers 
assigned to them; therefore the total number of firms is 
lower than that in Table 1. χ2=4.49 (d.F.=4) is insignificant 
at α=.05.  
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Table 5: Structural Data of Firms Interviewed (Source: Survey Results) 
Inter-
view 
Code  
Year 
Estab-
lished 
City 
(Location) 
NAICS 
Code 
Firm Type Design 
Involve-
ment 
Number of 
Employees 
Revenues 
(CAD million, 
2008 or 2009) 
Revenue 
Growth (%) 
Last 3 Years  
201 1976 Cambridge 3329 Fabrication None 25 5.0 3 
202 1994 Cambridge 3334 Fabrication Limited 10 1.0 15 
203 1988 Cambridge 3329 Fabrication Limited 25 4.0 20 
204 1996 Kitchener 3332 OEM Control 36 18.0 N/A 
205 2003 Cambridge 3334 Assembler Limited 24 N/A 100 
206 1996 Kitchener 3322 Fabrication Limited 25 3.0 0 
207 1993 Cambridge 3332 Fabrication None 22 N/A 15 
208 1963 Cambridge 3325 OEM Control 85 N/A 10 
209 1994 Cambridge 3325 Fabrication Limited 150 15.0 0 
210 1987 Guelph 3329 Assembler Limited 50 5.4 5 
211 1906 Waterloo 3352 OEM Control 600 200.0 12 
212 1985 Kitchener 3322 Fabrication None 70 8.0 10 
213 1992 Kitchener 3363 OEM Control 59 35.0 5 
214 1945 Guelph 3329 OEM Control 4 0.5 0 
215 1951 Guelph 3329 OEM Control 800 200.0 4 
216 1966 Waterloo 3323 Fabrication Limited 45 8.0 10 
217 1976 Kitchener 3369 OEM Control 95 26.0 35 
218 1986 Waterloo 3327 Fabrication None 20 N/A N/A 
219 1988 Waterloo 3334 Fabrication Limited 7 N/A N/A 
220 1957 Cambridge 3321 Fabrication Limited 245 35.0 -5 
221 1984 Cambridge 3327 Fabrication None 22 5.0 20 
222 1960 Kitchener 3323 Fabrication None 14 3.3 100 
223 1966 Guelph 3361 OEM Control 8087 2,300.0 15 
224 1974 Cambridge 3322 Fabrication None 60 24.0 -45 
225 1948 Kitchener 3328 Coating/ Heat Treating None 675 75.0 -40 
226 1994 Waterloo 3364 Fabrication None 12 N/A 15 
227 1974 Waterloo 3329 Fabrication Limited 60 10.0 35 
228 1944 Waterloo 3329 Fabrication None 78 9.0 12 
229 1946 Guelph 3323 Fabrication None 65 15.0 4 
230 1989 Guelph 3328 Coating/ Heat Treating None 30 5.2 5 
231 1991 Cambridge 3328 OEM Control 350 100.0 5 
232 1955 Guelph 3328 Coating/ Heat Treating None 8 N/A N/A 
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233 1917 Guelph 3359 OEM Control 501 75.0 9 
234 1990 Guelph 3324 OEM Control 4 N/A N/A 
235 1979 Guelph 3261 Coating/ Heat Treating None 2 N/A N/A 
236 1990 Guelph 3327 Coating/ Heat Treating None 2 0.14 -66 
237 1972 Guelph 3331 OEM Control 300 300.0 20 
238 1975 Guelph 3332 Fabrication Limited 7 1.3 3 
239 1988 Guelph 3327 Fabrication Limited 10 1.0 0 
240 1997 Guelph 3363 Fabrication Limited 70 24.0 -50 
Notes: OEM = Original Equipment Manufacturer; N/A = not available. 
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Table 6: Number of Firms Interviewed in CTT by Role in the Innovation Process, Type of 
Innovation and Firm Type, 2008-2009 (Source: Survey Results) 
 
Primary Forms of 
Innovation  
Role of Firms in the Innovation Process 
by Firm Type No Role in 
Design 
Feedback on 
Manufacturing 
Blueprints 
Full Control of 
Product/Process 
Designs 
Total 
1. Product Innovators (n1=16) 
OEMs 0 0 12 12  
Assemblers 0 1 0 1 
Fabrication Shops 0 2 0 2 
Coating/Heat Treating 1 0 0 1 
2. Process Innovators (n2=17) 
OEMs 0 0 0 0 
Assemblers 0 1 0 1 
Fabrication Shops 7 7 0 14 
Coating/Heat Treating 2 0 0 2 
3. Non-innovators (n3=7) 
OEMs 0 0 - 0 
Assemblers 0 0 - 0 
Fabrication Shops 3 2 - 5 
Coating/Heat Treating 2 0 - 2 
Total 15 13 12 40 
Note: OEMs = Original Equipment Manufacturers.  
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Endnotes  
 
1 CTT was jointly established in the late 1980s by the cities of Cambridge, Guelph, 
Kitchener and Waterloo to market the region’s technological strengths and reduce inter-
municipal competition (Cities of Cambridge, Guelph, Kitchener and Waterloo, 1988; Bathelt and 
Hecht, 1990). Although Guelph left this initiative later to market its strengths individually, the 
local economies are still linked to one another, draw from a shared labor market and depend on 
similar economic conditions, even in traditional manufacturing industries. Therefore, the entire 
region is referred to here as CTT.  
2 An example is the interpretation of Leipzig’s economic trajectory as one along a 
related-variety path (Neffke et al., 20092011).  
3 Within economic analysis, the term “resiliency” is contested due to the implication that 
the goal of regions would be to return to economic or industrial equilibrium after an external 
shock (Christopherson et al., 2010; Hassink, 2010; Pike et al., 2010; Park, 2010). Re-bundling, in 
contrast, does not pre-suppose a return to previous spatial and industrial configurations, but 
rather emphasizes and examines the ability of networks of firms and institutions to adjust to new 
economic realities after periods of rupture.  
4 To conduct research during such an important event, of course, raises serious 
methodological considerations. In particular, the immediate stress of the crises no doubt had an 
impact on our respondents. However, this bias is likely to be no greater than that produced by 
investigating the effects of the crisis years after they have occurred. Studies conducted during a 
crisis are an important source of knowledge of how firms and regions react to the intense 
economic pressures brought about. As the most severe effects of the crisis were seemingly 
overcome when this research was completed, we are confident that the structures and processes 
identified are not just short-term reactions to the crisis. In fact, our positive evaluation of the 
ability of firms to minimize crisis effects through innovation, as discussed in the empirical 
section, is also supported by comments from industry observers. Wilding (2010), for instance, 
the President of the Toronto Board of Trade, expresses concerns about the economic strength of 
CTT in relation to Toronto after the economic crisis. In a commentary about a future regional 
strategy of the Toronto region, she wrote that “city-regions such as London [England], Chicago 
and even Kitchener/ Waterloo/ Cambridge act as regional zones, snatching new investment and 
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jobs away from Toronto …”. The region’s economic revival goes also along with a recovery of 
the Southern Ontario automobile parts industry in 2010 (Van Alphen, 2010). It is clear, however, 
that future studies will have to be conducted to measure and understand the full effects of the 
crisis.  
5 This was not always obvious when attempting to book interviews with the firms as the 
telephone numbers were still place. It sometimes took us up to 10 phone calls to find out about 
the actual state of the firms and receive an answer regarding our interview requests. Our 
experience included of diverse set of, often unexpected, replies ranging from crying secretaries 
and an offer to buy a recently closed factory to a phone call with a security guard who was the 
only person left in the warehouse to make sure the inventory was safe.  
6 Changes to improve the manufacturability of a part were limited to modifications that 
reduced production costs but did not affect the function of the part in its final assembly. 
7 Some firms suggested that this was an intentional strategy. They benefited from the 
consistency and efficiency of working with a few large customers, but used smaller projects to 
explore potential opportunities to diversify their customer-base and the industries they serve. 
8 Diversification was also an important strategy in the renewal of the Aberdeen oil 
complex since the 1990s (Chapman et al., 2004). 
9 The trend to diversify into areas such as green machining, wind turbines and solar 
energy has been an important part of the innovation strategy of regional automobile suppliers, 
such as Linamar, Magna International and Meikle Automation (Hamilton, 2009).  
10 Even in the middle of Chevrolet’s bankruptcy, several smaller firms reported increased 
sales to Chevrolet because of high consumer demand for the 2010 Camaro. 
11 The layoffs were strongest in the automobile production and supplier sector of the 
region (Van Alphen, 2008; 2009), and particularly hit those operations that were largely or 
exclusively dependent on Chrysler and GM (Keenan, 2009; GuelphMercury.com, 2009).  
12 The firm worked closely with the local material suppliers and allied metal-finishing 
firms to help them grow large enough to support the firm’s operations. This was part of the 
broader strategy to shift to consumer products and broaden product offerings. 
